Key Points
In this article we explore whether active timing of smart beta strategies and/or factor tilts can benefit investors. We find that performance can easily be improved by emphasizing the factors or strategies that are trading cheap relative to their historical norms and by deemphasizing the more expensive factors or strategies. We also observe that aggressive bets (favoring only the cheapest factor or smart beta strategy) can severely erode Sharpe ratios, so that gentle or moderate tilts toward that factor or strategy would seem to be a sensible compromise. Finally, we note that both factor and smart beta strategies have typically been identified and accepted as potentially alpha generating by the finance and investing communities after a period of impressive success-indeed, many of our own tests include a span that predates their discovery. We show that out-of-sample tests, after a strategy or factor has been discovered, are often far less impressive.
We Are All Market (and Factor) Timers! How many times have we been drawn to a strategy, factor tilt, fund or ETF, asset class, or individual stock based on its past performance, goaded by a fear we're missing out?
How often are we repelled when a strategy, factor, fund, or manager has been persistently disappointing, driven by a concern that past is prologue? In seeking new sources of diversification, how often do we ask if the winners are newly expensive, poised to disappoint, or if the losing investments we may be ready to drop are newly cheap, poised to provide wonderful results? How often do we even consider selecting a poorly performing investment or strategy, thinking it may now be cheap? In each of these examples, we're not only market timing, we're performance chasing.
We're all market timers, even in the halls of academe.
Value investing goes back centuries, but the value factor, per se, wasn't "discovered" in academic literature until 1977. 4 In 1977, the Fama-French value portfolio (the 30% of the market with the highest book-to-price ratio) was priced more richly relative to the growth portfolio (the 30% with the lowest book-to-price ratio) than ever before or since, in data back to 1926. Similarly, the size effect was first published in the academic literature in 1981, near the end of its impressive 1975-mid-1983 run, and just ahead of a disastrous 15 years through 1999, during which the cumulative wealth of the Russell 2000 investor fell by more than half relative to the Russell 1000 investor.
Our experience from interacting with clients, investors, and market pundits suggests that many-including sophisticated large institutional investors-are already timing factors and smart beta strategies. 5 Unfortunately, many are doing so in a self-destructive way by trimming reliance on newly cheap factors and strategies, while increasing allocations to newly expensive factors and strategies, activities detrimental to both Sharpe ratios and returns. Many When evaluating managers, mutual funds, and strategies, common practice is to look at both recent and long-term performance. Disappointing recent fund performance can be seen as a signal that the manager has "lost it," perhaps by exhausting a source of alpha. Alternatively, it may signal that the manager did not have the skill to outperform in the first place. The possibility that the manager's strategy is newly cheap (and therefore attractive) is rarely considered. A three-or five-year span, and often even a shorter spell, of underperformance-in extreme cases, just a few quarters-can suffice to get a manager fired; consequently, a subsequent reversal of shortfall would never be observed because the manager no longer manages the divested assets. To replace the underperforming managers, investors usually reallocate the divested funds to managers who have recently delivered wonderful performance.
Today in smart beta land we notice similar behavior. If a factor underperforms for multiple years (e.g., value's recent nine-year span in the dog house!), investors question if the factor (or strategy) still works. Losing confidence in a particular strategy or factor, they may abandon it, trim it, or seek complementary strategies to diversify their risk. What strategies draw their attention? Generally only strategies or factors with superior recent performance.
Relative Valuation and Timing: How Well Does It Work?
Our first two articles explore the link between a strategy's valuation and its performance. Predictably, many have been asking us if relative valuation can be used to tactically time alpha from smart beta strategies. The short answer is yes.
The longer answer is it leads to a more concentrated risk profile. So, while it's easy for the patient, long-term investor to earn higher returns from factor and smart beta strategy timing, it's not easy to garner a materially higher Sharpe ratio. Many would view this as an acceptable outcome; after all, we can't spend a Sharpe ratio.
We study eight representative smart beta strategies 6 and eight factors, 7 including two variants of the value factor.
Our focus on only eight, in a world of rampant product and factor proliferation, is more illustrative than prescriptive and is itself a form of data mining. Harvey, Liu, and Heqing (2015) found that some 314 "new" factors-many of them minor variants on other factors-had been published by the end of 2012. Our work can't cover them all.
We test whether relative valuation can help forecast future returns for these eight factors and eight strategies. Even seemingly similar factors and smart beta strategies can be at different relative valuation levels. For example, value (based on a blend of valuation metrics) is cheap in the US, but dividend strategies are not. Minimum variance and low beta are in the top deciles of their historical relative valuations, whereas low-vol strategies that filter out high multiple stocks, as RAFI Low Volatility™ does, are only modestly above their historical norms.
In our replications of smart beta strategies and factors, we attempt to follow a uniform approach. 8 Smart beta strategies are long-only portfolios; we display their performance relative to the capitalization-weighted benchmark.
By contrast, each factor represents a long-short portfolio.
Our long portfolio holds the 30% of the market with the most desirable attributes based on that factor definition, and the short portfolio holds the 30% of the market with the least desirable attributes; both are taken from the largecap universe. (The methodology is provided at the end of the article.) For the factors, the performance is the difference between the long and the short portfolios. We display in with each other, the number of totally independent factors or strategies is lower than eight. We find a greater opportunity set among factors than among smart beta strategies, which means we would expect any active timing to produce larger effects when implemented across factors-effects which could be for better or for worse.
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Active Timing in Factors and Smart Beta Strategies: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly Consider a trend chaser who invests in the three (of eight) smart beta strategies (or factors) having the best blend of 1-, 3-, 5-and 10-year performance at the beginning of each year. This hypothetical rule is a very rough caricature of the way many investors actually invest.
Before going further, however, we would like to stress we're not advocating a simple reliance on the three cheapest factors or three cheapest smart beta strategies measured relative to their own historical valuation norms, let alone concentrating bets in the one or two cheapest factors or strategies we test. We're demonstrating that even a simple approach that invests in a lightly diversified roster of three worst performing or least expensive factors or strategies can beat a naïve approach that equally weights all factors or strategies. The strategies are used 1) to illustrate that contrarian investing works across factors and smart betas, 2) to show that trend chasing in factors and smart betas creates a performance drag, and 3) to explore the tradeoff between factor timing and factor diversification. Selecting the three smart beta strategies with the best past performance would have cost the trend-chasing investor 30 basis points (bps) of value-add (1.2% versus 1.5%) compared to sticking with the average smart beta strategy through thick and thin. In the case of factors, the trend chaser loses half of the excess return (1.2% versus 2.4%) relative to the average factor. With the reduction in valueadd comes an increase in risk because of the concentration in three (versus eight) strategies. Our smart beta trend chaser suffers a drop in information ratio from 0.34 to 0.25, and our factor trend chaser's Sharpe ratio plummets from 0.52 to 0.14. Trend chasing, even sensibly using up to 10 years of history to choose our strategies, demonstrably destroys value, even as it increases risk.
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Now, let's see how our contrarian investor fares. In the case of the smart beta strategies, the contrarian bests the trend chaser with a materially higher value-add (2.2% versus To explore whether our result is a random outlier, we examine the selection rule based separately on past performance over each of the time spans (1, 3, 5, and 10 years) used to form the trend-chasing and contrarian strategies. Panels B and D also show the results for the Fama-French four-factor attribution of the returns. The difference between the contrarian and trend-chasing strategies seems to have reliably positive value loading and negative momentum loading. But the most interesting result is that, when controlling for the average factor exposures, the return difference is mostly alpha, net of Fama-French factor tilts.
Panels A and C of
Perhaps, surprisingly, the Fama-French four-factor alpha is even larger than the simple return difference in more than half of the cases.
What's Going On?
Readers of the first two articles in this series know the answer. Valuations matter!
In Figure 2 , 13 we plot the relative valuations and subsequent performance, spanning nearly a half-century, for the blended value factor and the equally weighted smart beta strategy. Relative valuation measures, for the value factor, how expensive the long side is compared to the short side, and for the equally weighted strategy, measures relative to the market. Note: We display data from overlapping periods. Overlapping periods create a visual illusion of more data points than the data contain. The period January 1967-August 2016 has just under 10 non-overlapping 5-year periods and just under 5 non-overlapping 10-year periods.
All the t-stats are Newey-West adjusted to account for serial correlation occurring from overlapping data.
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We use an aggregate valuation measure that averages four relative valuation metrics-price-to-five-year-earnings, price-to-five-year-sales, price-to-five-year-dividends, and price-to-book ratios-with each measured relative to the cap-weighted market multiple. Note: We display data from overlapping periods. Overlapping periods create a visual illusion of more data points than the data contain. The period January 1967-August 2016 has just under 10 non-overlapping 5-year periods and just under 5 non-overlapping 10-year periods.
All t-stats are clustered by both year-month and strategy(factor) to control for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity as described in Petersen (2009 
Panel B. Cumulative Growth in Wealth of the Most and Least Expensive Strategies and Factors
Any use of the above content is subject to all important legal disclosures, disclaimers, and terms of use found at www.researchaffiliates.com, which are fully incorporated by reference as if set out herein at length.
www.researchaffiliates.com Are these included in any of our tests, or any of the commercially available multi-strategy programs? Of course not.
Our tests of the adoption of recently disappointing strategies or of the cheapest strategies relative to their own historical norms (i.e., a contrarian approach) does not rely on look-ahead bias, and therefore is not subject to the worst forms of data mining. Even so, we would not be surprised to find less incremental alpha from a contrarian reliance on cheaper strategies than our own tests would indicate.
Measuring the Impact of Data Mining from Academic "Factor Timing"
Investors are hardly the only factor timers. Academics and product innovators are timing right along with investors.
We're huge fans of product innovation, but there's good news and bad news in the product proliferation that results. Academics have been looking at factors for a number of decades now. Indeed, the "new" factor-tilt approach to investing dates back to the early 1990s, if not earlier.
In academia, publications and citations beget tenure and academic success, strong incentive for the "discov- Newly launched products are, not surprisingly, based only on indices, strategies, and factors with positive backtested returns. 18 We mine data to find ideas that (historically) work. We publish and build products only on those with noteworthy profitable results. There's no wickedness involved here; all of us are genuinely seeking the best ideas from the past, tacitly presuming that past is prologue.
Those who invest in these ideas are wise to be skeptical and to give touted performance numbers a haircut: a light one for very simple ideas that are not heavily data mined and a much heavier one for profoundly data-mined ideas that are carefully fit to historical data.
We can, albeit with very poor precision, measure the "phantom alpha" of new factors. Our analysis looks at how the smart beta strategy or factor fares after it was discovered, and how those results compare with the results that brought attention to the idea in the first place. Table 4 presents our findings. The average excess return of the smart beta strategies (Panel A) before index launch is 1.8%.
After launch the average excess return is 1.4%, or 0.4% lower. The average excess return of the factors (Panel B)
before publication is 5.8%, and after publication only 2.4%.
On average, about 22% of the smart beta alpha, and over half of the factor alpha, evaporated after launch or publication. Six of the eight factors produced lower returns after they were published.
Some of the lower performance after publication or index launch can be explained by in-sample bias: it is easier to notice, and to publish, a strategy or factor that has delivered statistically significant past performance, even if that success was luck (or upward revaluation). Another reason for the performance difference is, no doubt, arbitrageurs trying to profit from the newly publicized source of better performance. Lastly, and very likely, the strong past returns that caught the interest of academics included revaluation alpha from rising relative valuation multiples. Any use of the above content is subject to all important legal disclosures, disclaimers, and terms of use found at www.researchaffiliates.com, which are fully incorporated by reference as if set out herein at length.
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Thus, academics discover factors when they are expensive, which drives their prospects for future returns down.
The fiduciary standard may pull us even further toward performance chasing. Although it may be profitable to invest in a factor or strategy with miserable past performance, the decision could be quickly branded "imprudent" whenever the investment inevitably fails to add value.
Consultants, RIAs, and financial advisors are obviously reluctant to advise a client to invest in a newly cheap strategy or factor, knowing they could be successfully sued if it doesn't work. Given that chasing past performance may be a good way for fiduciaries to avoid the label of imprudence, even if one of the worst ways to add value, we believe our findings may actually understate the future efficacy of contrarian investing in a world that ever more reliably shuns bargains.
Measuring the Impact of Data Mining from International Evidence
Another way to gauge-again crudely-how much error is introduced by data mining is to go "out of sample" by looking at results using international data. Most of the smart beta strategies and factors were identified in the US stock 
Conclusion
Can investors time markets, factors, and strategies? Our answer is not only "yes, they can" but almost everyone is already doing so, often without realizing it. Unfortunately, most investors are factor timing in the wrong way by chasing past performance, similar to the temptations many face in manager selection and asset allocation. Investors who choose to invest in strategies with the better past (and often recent past) performance hurt themselves, especially when they do so without asking whether the strategy (or asset class or factor) delivered that past performance merely by becoming newly expensive and whether the strategy is trading at dangerous valuation levels. Some practitioners counsel against asking these questions. We find this advice disturbing.
We show that trend chasing-even when diversifying among three factors with the recent strongest results, and even with a cherry-picked set of strategies that have performed well over the half-century span we test-can destroy the benefits of factor investing. If we had any way to eliminate the data mining and selection bias and to conduct a true out-of-sample test, results could only be worse for trend chasing (and admittedly, the benefits from contrarian trading of strategies might also be less than the results we show here). If investors swing into smart beta strategies and factor tilts that today have wonderful 5-and 10-year alphas without asking whether they are newly expensive, and those alphas reverse in the years ahead, smart beta investing could go "horribly wrong."
Today, currently stretched relative valuations provide a smart beta/factor investing opportunity, that when used intelligently, can instead be "beautifully right." Selecting strategies with sound structural alpha-sound performance when controlled for rising valuation multiples-currently trading at a discount to historical norms may deliver performance higher, not lower, than the backtests. Smart beta is crowded space, consisting of some good ideas, some not-so-good ideas, and some good ideas that are temporarily overpriced. Look before you leap!
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Appendix Diversification Effects in Timing Smart Betas and Factors
In our analysis of the eight smart beta strategies, we observe that a combination of the three strategies with the most attractive (least expensive) valuations tends to generate a higher return relative to an equally weighted mix of all eight strategies. The higher return does not come with an improvement in the Sharpe ratio because of the loss in diversification relative to the well-diversified equally weighted mix. To further study the benefits of diversification, we simulate one more strategy:
• Tilted Diversification toward Least Expensive Strategy: Weight all strategies and factors from the least to the most expensive proportional to 4,4,3,3,2,2,1,1.
The performance of this strategy is presented in Figure A1 . We compare its return and risk to three other approaches: an equally weighted allocation, a contrarian approach combining the three worst-performing strategies/factors, and a combination of the three strategies/factors with the least-expensive valuations. For both smart beta strategies and factors, the tilted-diversification-toward least-expensive strategy results in lower performance when compared to 
Factors
Equal Weight and Contrarian Factors
Average Alpha (Ann.) Sharpe Ratio the least-expensive, less-diversified strategy, but it does have a higher Sharpe ratio. More details on the performance of the strategies and their opposites are reported in Table A1 .
We learn from this additional simulation that the value of a timing signal is limited when applied with breadth. The timing signal based on relative valuation is not an exception. Although relative valuation provides a useful signal for timing factors and smart beta strategies, it is prudent to apply it in moderation so as not to raise the risk level of the overall portfolio from a loss of diversification.
A static allocation component to the trend-chasing and contrarian factor-timing approaches merits investigation. In the US markets, where factors are usually first discovered, most spend roughly equal amounts of time in the winner and loser portfolios. Some factors, however, are not robust out of the US sample and do not work as well internationally. The trend chaser who invests in the winning factors, therefore, will tend to pick up factors such as value and momentum that work out of sample, whereas the contrarian who invests in the losing factors will tend to pick up nonrobust factors having poor international returns.
In Panels C (US) and G (International) in Table A2 , we compute returns to portfolios that were given static allocations according to how frequently they appeared in the winner and loser portfolios. Subtracting these returns from those of the factor-timing trend chasers and contrarians in Panels B (US) and F (International),
gives us the net effect in Panels D (US) and H (International)-the returns coming from dynamically changing factor allocations. Panels E (US) and I (International) compare the net dynamic trend chasers to the net dynamic contrarians.
By selecting recent winners, trend-chasing strategies are more likely to pick up expensive factors, but are also more likely to pick up robust factors with significant structural alpha. When we account for this tendency, we find the contrarian improves even more against the trend chaser. The ideal factor-timing strategy, therefore, would involve first evaluating which of the hundreds of factors can be expected to persist long into the future; that is, which are robust across many regions and definitions, and have sound economic or behavioral explanations for their persistence. 19 Of the factors that pass these robustness checks, investors should tilt toward those that are less expensive relative to their historical valuations. Any use of the above content is subject to all important legal disclosures, disclaimers, and terms of use found at www.researchaffiliates.com, which are fully incorporated by reference as if set out herein at length. Any use of the above content is subject to all important legal disclosures, disclaimers, and terms of use found at www.researchaffiliates.com, which are fully incorporated by reference as if set out herein at length. As an example, in order to simulate the value factor in the United States, we construct the value stock portfolio from stocks above the 70th percentile on the NYSE by book-to-market ratio, and we construct the growth stock portfolio from stocks below the 30th percentile by the same measure. Internationally, we construct the value stock portfolio from stocks above the 70th percentile in their region (North America, Japan, Asia Pacific, and Europe) by book-to-market, and the growth stock portfolio from stocks below the 30th percentile in their region.
Panel C.
Factors: Returns and Sharpe Ratios of Most and Least Expensive
The stocks are then market-cap weighted within each of the two portfolios, which are used to form a long-short factor portfolio. Portfolios are rebalanced annually each January with the exception of momentum, which is rebalanced monthly. US data extend from January 1967 to August 2016 and developed ex US from January 1983 to August 2016, and has been filtered to exclude ETFs and uninvestable securities such as state-owned enterprises and stocks with little to no liquidity. The signals used to sort the various factor portfolios follow:
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For Smart Beta Strategies
We use the universe of stocks of the top 1,000 US and developed ex US companies by market capitalization for all smart betas with the exception of the Fundamental Index™, for which we use the top 1,000 companies by fundamental size.
The portfolios are defined as follows:
Fundamental Index
Select and weight the top 1,000 stocks by fundamental score using five-year averages of cash flows, dividends, and sales, and most recent book value of equity. For details see Arnott, Hsu, and Moore (2005) Low Volatility Index
From the top 1,000 stocks by market cap, select the bottom 200 stocks by volatility, which is estimated with one year of daily returns, and weight them by 1/volatility. This methodology is similar to the S&P Low Volatility Index which selects the bottom 100 from the S&P 500 Index, using the same measure of volatility, and weights by 1/volatility. From the top 1,000 stocks by market cap, select the top 200 stocks by dividend yield, removing companies with declining dividends (ones with most-recent-year dividends lower than prior five-year average), and weight them by dividend yield. This is comparable to the Dow Jones Select Dividend Index methodology, which selects the highest-yielding 100 from the largest 500 companies by market capitalization, using a similar selection and weighting process as we employ here. Details available at: http://djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/meth_info/methodology-dj-dividend-indices.pdf
Risk Efficient
We replicate methodology laid out in Amenc et al. (2010) , a strategy popularized by EDHEC. Mean-variance optimized portfolio assuming that expected excess returns are proportional to the stocks' downside semi-deviation, and with a stringent constraint to limit portfolio concentration (λ=2).
Maximum Diversification
We replicate methodology laid out in Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) , a strategy popularized by Tobam portfolio optimized to maximize the expected diversification ratio, defined as the ratio of weighted-average risk to the expected portfolio risk.
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Timing Methodology
The following timing methods were employed across smart beta strategies and factors:
*Relative valuation is defined as an aggregate of four relative valuation measures: relative price to book (P/B), relative price to earnings (P/E), relative price to sales (P/S), and relative price to dividends (P/D). Each of these is defined as the price-to-fundamental ratio of the long side divided by the price-to-fundamental ratio of the short side in the case of factors, and the price-to-fundamental ratio of the strategy divided by the price-to-fundamental ratio of the market in the case of smart betas. For example, the relative P/B of RAFI would be and the relative P/B of the momentum factor would be . We use five-year averages for company-level earnings, sales, and dividends in computing fundamental ratios. At the portfolio level, we then take the geometric average of relative P/B, P/E, P/S, and P/D to compute relative valuation.
Relative valuation is predictive of future factor and smart beta returns, as shown in "To Win with Smart Beta, Ask
If the Price Is Right." When comparing across strategies for the purposes exploring timing strategies, it is important to compare each portfolio's relative valuation to its own history. We compute the in-sample z-score of relative valuation for the purposes of selecting and allocating across strategies and factors.
Timing Method Signal Description
Trend www.researchaffiliates.com Endnotes 1. We previously used the term "situational alpha," but others have suggested "revaluation alpha," which we rather like better than our own nomenclature! We're embracing the change in terminology in this third article of our series.
2. We do not mean this in any pejorative way. We're all data miners, even if inadvertently, merely in the act of seeking ideas that can add value. While there's (usually) nothing nefarious about it, we owe it to ourselves and to our clients to acknowledge we're engaged in data mining and to try to minimize the extent our decisions rely on it.
3. As we've shown in previous articles, factor tilts explain most of structural alpha. This is not to say these alphas could be recreated with factor tilts! As we'll explore in a future article, factor-tilt strategies deliver factor alpha minus implementation shortfall. The fact that smart beta strategies mostly have alpha, over and above the alpha explained by factor tilts, is actually a huge "win."
4. Value investing first appeared in the academic literature in Basu (1977) .
5. We distinguish between factor tilts and smart beta strategies for reasons outlined in Arnott and Kose (2014) . We're clearly losing this battle as the term "smart beta" is stretched to encompass factor-tilt strategies and a host of ideas, some smart, some not smart. If the term smart beta encompasses almost everything, then the term means nothing.
6. We examine the Fundamental Index™, an equally weighted index, a low-volatility index, the FTSE RAFI™ Low Volatility Index, a quality index, a dividend-weighted index, a risk-efficient index, and a maximum-diversification index.
7. We examine value (Fama-French HML) , low beta, gross profitability, momentum (UMD), size (SMB), illiquidity, and investment. As a robustness check we test two versions of value. One is constructed using the price-to-book ratio (the most common academic definition of value), and one is based on a blend of four valuation metrics: price-to-five-year-earnings, price-to-five-yearsales, price-to-five-year dividends, and price-to-book ratios. With two versions of value we have a total of eight factors which we use as a starting point in our analysis.
8. All smart beta strategies are constructed from the largest 1,000 stocks by market capitalization to make comparison less vulnerable to idiosyncrasies unrelated to index methodology. The only exception is the Fundamental Index where, following methodology of Arnott, Hsu, and Moore (2005) , we use the top 1,000 names by fundamental measures of company size. With the exception of the momentum factor portfolio, which is rebalanced monthly, all other factors (and all smart beta strategies) are rebalanced annually at yearend.
9. Slippage can be huge. The momentum factor has delivered a 5% return (up stocks beating down stocks by 5% a year) since the last momentum "shock" during the global financial crisis. Despite this, we are not aware of any momentum funds that have delivered a positive alpha, let alone 5%.
10. On closer examination we find most of the popular smart beta strategies are positively correlated to the Fundamental Index and the dividend index, indications of a strong element of value and small-cap exposure relative to the benchmark. The benchmark assigns weights proportional to company capitalization, overweighting overpriced growth companies and underweighting underpriced value companies. The value exposure almost automatically arises as the byproduct of many smart beta strategies not using capitalization to assign weights to individual stocks.
11. The Opportunity Set (OS) is defined by Grinold and Taylor (2009) as ≡ ′Ω −1 , where r is the vector of excess returns and Ω is the covariance matrix. While OS is technically the maximum ex post Sharpe ratio that could have been obtained by optimal allocation (in our case allocation across the eight smart beta strategies or eight factors), it is also a useful measure of the effective breadth of a portfolio. Portfolios can achieve breadth and increase their opportunity set by including more assets, especially if they have low correlations with each other. For example, making investment decisions across 10 uncorrelated assets will provide more opportunity for higher performance than with only 5 uncorrelated assets. Likewise, 10 uncorrelated assets will provide more opportunity than 10 assets with correlation near 1.0 (having correlation near 1.0 would be similar to having the breadth of just 1 asset). Similarly, portfolios with more volatile assets have more breadth and a larger opportunity set. For example, 10 volatile assets will provide more opportunity than 10 assets whose prices don't move; without changing prices, even the most skilled investor could not outperform. We find that our set of eight factors provides more opportunity to take advantage of timing signals than our set of eight smart beta strategies. We, therefore, expect a wider spread between timing well versus timing poorly in factors than we do in smart betas. This is, in fact, exactly what we see.
12. Hsu, Myers, and Whitby (2016) show that investors are measurably destroying value by selling funds at cheap levels and buying at expensive levels. The poor timing of purchases and sales by investors destroys value, resulting in their underperforming the broad market.
13. For illustrative purposes, we show two charts from our prior work updated through August 2016. Please refer to the first two articles in this series for a complete set of these analyses.
14. This comparison is of the relative valuation of a factor or strategy to its own prior norm with no look-ahead bias. The statistical significance is particularly interesting because this would be expected to degrade the statistical significance, relative to an in-sample test.
15. We have fallen prey to this error, too! When Jason Hsu, Philip Moore, and I published "Fundamental Indexation" in 2005, it did not occur to us to test whether RAFI™ was newly expensive at that time or to test if the past performance of RAFI was partly driven by rising valuations. Had we done so, we would have discovered that a modest fraction of the historical alpha of RAFI was revaluation alpha, and that RAFI was trading a little rich at the time. This gives us special satisfaction to observe that RAFI has added value since its introduction, all over the world, despite a headwind of becoming cheaper-much cheaper-over the subsequent decade. We can't wait to see how it works when it finally enjoys a tailwind from value winning! 16. In our earlier articles, our analysis began in 1967. Our current analysis begins in 1977 because we use trailing 10-year performance as one of the selection criteria in our strategy and factor-timing tests. We also use valuation relative to that factor or strategy's own history; starting in 1977 allows us to start with 10 years of historical valuation data.
17. Harvey, Liu, and Heqing (2015) cannot recall in their survey a single published article about a new factor or smart beta strategy that did not reportedly generate alpha.
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18. According to Brightman, Li, and Liu (2015) , ETF providers evidently take investors' preference for winners into account by predominately launching funds whose underlying indices are outperforming at the time they make new product decisions.
19. Beck et al. (2016) provide an examination of factor robustness and implementation costs.
The material contained in this document is for general information purposes only. It is not intended as an offer or a solicitation for the purchase and/or sale of any security, derivative, commodity, or financial instrument, nor is it advice or a recommendation to enter into any transaction. Research results relate only to a hypothetical model of past performance (i.e., a simulation) and not to an asset management product. No allowance has been made for trading costs or management fees, which would reduce investment performance. Actual results may differ. Index returns represent back-tested performance based on rules used in the creation of the index, are not a guarantee of future performance, and are not indicative of any specific investment. Indexes are not managed investment products and cannot be invested in directly. This material is based on information that is considered to be reliable, but Research Affiliates™ and its related entities (collectively "Research Affiliates") make this information available on an "as is" basis without a duty to update, make warranties, express or implied, regarding the accuracy of the information contained herein. Research Affiliates is not responsible for any errors or omissions or for results obtained from the use of this information. Nothing contained in this material is intended to constitute legal, tax, securities, financial or investment advice, nor an opinion regarding the appropriateness of any investment. The information contained in this material should not be acted upon without obtaining advice from a licensed professional. Research Affiliates, LLC, is an investment adviser registered under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Our registration as an investment adviser does not imply a certain level of skill or training.
Investors should be aware of the risks associated with data sources and quantitative processes used in our investment management process. Errors may exist in data acquired from third party vendors, the construction of model portfolios, and in coding related to the index and portfolio construction process. While Research Affiliates takes steps to identify data and process errors so as to minimize the potential impact of such errors on index and portfolio performance, we cannot guarantee that such errors will not occur. 
